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NOTES
EQUITY ACTS IN REM
INTRODUCTION

"Equity acts in personam, and not in rem." This maxim, at one time expressing a rule without exception, has now become little more than a mnemonic
clause to enable the student to remember the fundamental theory underlying
equitable procedure. It is the purpose of this note to explain in part, at least,
this categorical statement.
The maxim has been defined generally as meaning that equity dealt primarily with the person, and usually only through him with the res; 1 or that a
decree of chancery spoke in terms of personal command to the defendant, but
its directions could only be carried into effect by his personal act.2 Another writer
121
C. J.; No. 183, p. 194.
2
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence; No. 428, p. 206.
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has said of the maxim, that "it is almost always used to express the characteristic
form and mode of enforcement of -equity decrees, which command the party to
do, or refrain from doing, some act, enforced by coercion applied to the person,
as distinguished from the ordinary judgment at law which establishes a right in
the plaintiff, enforced by action of the officers of the state."' The origin of this
method of procedure has been ascribed to the fact that "in the infancy of the
court of chancery, while the chancellors were developing their system in the face
of a strong opposition, in order to avoid a direct collision with the law and with
the judgments of the law courts, they adopted the principle that their own rem4
edies and decrees should operate in personam upon defendants and not in rem."
However, all these attempted definitions are inadequate to give us an intelligent understanding of the maxim. Yet such an understanding is essential if we
are to grasp what departures have been made in present day equitable procedure.
Hohfeld 5 states that the phrases in personain and in rem, in spite of the scope
and variety of situations to which they are commonly applied, are more usually
assumed by judges, lawyers, and authors to be of unvarying meaning and free of
ambiguities, the exact opposite of which is, however, true. He goes on to state:
.... .the
antithetical pair of expressions, in personam, and in
rem, is constantly being employed as a basis for classifying at least
four distinct matters; and the respective meanings . . . are not the
same for all of the different situations involved: First, we have a
fundamental classification of primary rights as rights in personam,
and rights in rem; second, there is the well-known classification of
all judicial proceedings into proceedirk or actions in personam and
• . .in rem,; third, there exists the closely related classification of
judgments and decrees (and the corresponding jurisdictions of
courts) . . . in personam, and . . . in rem; fourth . . such enforcement is . . .in personam, or . . .in rem."O
In the treatment to follow, the reader must bear in mind, both in scrutinizing
statutes to be considered, and in analyzing cases to be cited, just with which of
the above four breakdowns the legislature or the courts are dealing.
While it is true, as we have observed, that equity originally acted only in
personam, yet numerous situations developed where such action was inexpedient,
impracticable, and ineffective; and the law courts, because of rigidity of form,
and the peculiarity of their remedies, were unable to grant relief. Suppose, for
,example, that the legal title of a trustee became vested in one incompetent to act
as trustee or to convey the legal title to a successor; equity, acting only in per3McClintock, Equity; 48. The author further states, "In modern times the maxim that equity
acts if personam has been used particularly in determining the territorial jurisdiction of courts
acting4 as courts of equity ..."
Pomeroy, Eq. Juris.; No. 428, p. 206.
5Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 26 Yale L. J. 713.
61d.,714, 715.
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sonam, could appoint a successor to act as a trustee, but could not vest the legal
title in him, nor could it order the title to be conveyed, since the holder had no
power to convey. 7 Or, suppose A, a non-resident vendor, contracts with B, a
vendee to convey land located where B resides; here equity, requiring jurisdiction
in personam, would be helpless to compel A to convey legal title if A remained
out of the court's territorial jurisdiction making personal service impossible. 8 Or
assume a situation where a non-resident's claim constituted a cloud on title to land
within the court's jurisdiction; 9 here also a court of equity would be helpless if it
acted only in personam.
Many more comparable situations could be cited. It suffices to say that the
frequent recurrence of such prayers for relief which equity could not grant led
some courts, without statutory authority, to act upon jurisdiction in rem;"0 while
others were enabled, by means of statutes," where the res is within the court's
jurisdiction to notify the defendants in some form or another, and act on the
jurisdiction in rem thus acquired. Pennsylvania has such a statute, and it is the
purpose of this article to consider some of the changes wrought by it, and some
of the problems it has created.
THE ACT OF 1859
The Act of 185912 provides as follows:
"It shall be lawful for any court of this Commonwealth having

jurisdiction, upon the special motion of the plaintiff or plaintiffs, in
any suit in equity which has or shall be instituted therein, concerning goods, chattels, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the
perpetuating of testimony concerning any lands, tenements and so

forth, situate or being within the jurisdiction of such court, or concerning any charge, lien, judgment, mortgage or encumbrance thereon, or where the court have acquired jurisdiction of the subject
matter in controversy, by the service of its process on one or more
of the principal defendants, to order and direct that... any.. process
...
be served upon any defendant or defendants therein, then
residing or being out of the jurisdiction of such court, wherever
he, she or they may reside or be found . . . and to proceed as
effectually as if the same had been made within the jurisdiction of
such court .......
Is
"Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court . . .
that any defendant or defendants in any such suit . . . cannot, upon
"Feribee v. Proctor, 19 N. C.,
8Garfein v. Mclnnis, 248 N.
No. 1.
9Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67
10Ciark, Equity, 563.
1121
C. J., No. 367, p. 358.
2
' Act of 1859, Apr. 6. P. L.
131d. No. 1.

439; see Pennsylvania Rules of Equity Practice, Rule 87.
Y. 261; 162 N. E. 73 (1928); Act 190l, Apr. 19, P. L. 83.
W. Va. 569; 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
387; 12 P. S. 1254-1256
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diligent inquiry, be found, so as to be personally served with any
process to be had therein, it shall be lawful for such court . . . to
make an order upon such defendant or defendants similar to the
requirements of such process, specifying the time when compliance
therewith must be made, and . . .to proceed as fully and effectually
as if such process had been duly served within the jurisdiction of
such court: Provided. That a statement of the substance and object
.and a copy of such order. . be published in such
of the bill .....
one or more 'newspapers, and at such times as such court shall, by
special order direct." '14
"No order or process of contempt shall be made or issued
."16
under this act
Any attempt to analyze intelligibly this statute seems naturally to give rise
to three lines of inquiry: First of all, we wish to determine upon what theory
the validity of such legislation, so apparently revolutionary of the historical maxim
thai: "equity acts in personam," can be sustained; secondly, what are the requisites
for invoking the statute; and finally, how extensive is the application of such a
statute. The first disposes of constitutionality, the second, of jurisdiction, and
the third, of decrees or judgments. We can best answer these problems by considering the interpretations placed upon this and similar acts by the courts.
CONSTITUTIONALITY

The basis of all real equitable procedure in Pennsylvania is statutory.' 6 Yet
the mere fact that this additional power has been given by statute does not make it
valid. It has been the policy of our jurisprudence to bring non-residents within
the jurisdiction of our courts only in very special cases. Commenting upon this
policy, it was said in Coleman's Appeal,17 "We may congratulate ourselves that
such has been the policy, for nothing can be more unjust than to drag a man
thousands of miles, perhaps from a distant state, and in effect compel him to
appear and defend under th'e penalty of a judgment or decree against him pro
con Fesso. The Act of 1859 ought, therefore, to receive a construction in harmony
with this policy. There seems no good reason why courts of equity should binvested with a more enlarged jurisdiction against non-residents than courts of
law." For a court to have jurisdiction over the person or property of an alien,
either that person or his property must be within the territory. Chief Justice
Gibson stated in Steel v. Smith 8 that an exercise of jurisdiction without this
14Id. No. 2.
151d. No. 3.
l6Morton's Estate, 201 Pa. 269 (1902).
7
1 Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 441 (1874).
18Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447, cited with approval in Wallace v. United Electric Company, 211 Pa. 473.
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presence or situs would be an "act of usurpation," adding further, that jurisdiction of property does not draw after it jurisdiction of the owner's person.
Since the Act of 1859 purports to give courts jurisdiction over defendants,
all or some of whom are without the territory, it must follow, then, in view of
the aforestated principles, that the Act depends for its validity, upon the presence
within the territory, of some property, or res which forms the subject matter of
the suit, and the object of the decree. That is precisely what the Supreme Court
of the United States held in the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 19 involving an
Oregon statute comparable to ours.
Said the court:
"Substituted service, by publication or in any other authorized form,
may be sufficient to inform partiesof the object of proceedings taken
where property is once brought under the control of the court by
seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumer that property is
always in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and it
proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not only
that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look
to any proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its
condemnation and sale . . .Such service may answer in all actions
which are substantially proceedings in rem. But where the entire
object of the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of one state
cannot run into another state, and summon parties there domiciled
to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them.
Publication of process or notice within the state where the tribunal
sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to
appear. Process sent to him out of the state, and process published
within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his
20
personal liability."
In Boudwin v. Boudwin, 2 1 plaintiff wife filed a bill in equity against defendant husband, a non-resident, complaining that he had deserted her and
refused to support her. She invoked statutory remedies providing for service
under the Act of 1859,22 against defendant's property in the county of suit. The
19Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 715 (1877)
20d., 726.
21Boudwin v. Boudwin, 320 Pa. 147 (1936).
22Acts of May 23, 1907, P. L. 227, No. 2; Apr. 27, 1909, P. L. 182, No. 1; July 21, 1913,
P. L. 867, No. 7: Whenever any man has heretofore separated, or hereafter shall separate,
himself from his wife, without reasonable cause, or whose whereabouts are unknown, and, being
of sufficient ability, has neglected or refused or shall neglect or refuse to provide suitable maintenance for his said wife, proceedings may be had against any property, real or personal, of said
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court granted an order directing service on the defendant, calling for the entering
of an appearance and the filing of An answer, with notice that faiture to appear
and answer would result in a decree pro confessa. Affidavit was filed, stating
that defendant had been served out of state; appearance was entered for defenadant de bene esse,23 and court was petitioned to set aside service. On the
court's refusal, and defendant's appeal, the Supreme Court stated: "The acts of
Assembly authorizing a proceeding such as this one could not grant authority to
a chancellor to require a defendant outside the jurisdiction of the court to appear
and answer. The proceeding. . . is one purely in rem. It may be proper to give
a defendant . . .notice . . . He may ignore the notice if he likes . . .The
proceeding will go ahead against any property of his within the jurisdiction which
24
the court has taken within its grasp."
The court reversed the action of the lower court, remanding it for disposition
in rem. It is interesting to observe that after the lower court entered its decree
in rem, defendant filed a bill in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the decree upon the ground that its
effect is to deprive him of property without due process of law. There again he
lost, the Court holding that, "under these circumstances Boudwin cannot be heard
to object that he did not have notice of the proceedings, nor an opportunity to
25
"defend; this, however, is all tBat the due process clause guarantees him."
What conclusions, then, can we draw at this point? It appears certain, at
least, hat legislatiai of this character does encroach upon an almost laissez-faire
policy of the courts where non-residents are concerned. Yet, such an encroach.
mnt, so-called, is valid if kept within recognized bounds, that is, if the court
does not essay to entertain proceedings other than those directly affecting some
res concededly within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Our task now is to
determine just when, and how, and in what types of actions, the court has this
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION

In studying the phraseology of the statute, we see that the legislature starts
out with the broad general statement that "it shall be lawful . . .in any suit in
equity . . ." The latitude of this beginning, however, is restricted by modifying
clause which limits "any suit" to four specific classes of cases, viz., (1) concerning goods, chattels, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, (2) for the perpet.husband, necessary for the suitable maintenance of the said wife; and the court may direct a
seizure and sale, or mortgage, of sufficient of such estate as will provide the necessary funds for
such maintenance; and service upon the defendant shall be made in the manner provided in the
act of General Assembly, entitled "An act to authorize the execution of process in certain cases in
equity, concerning property within the jurisdiction of the court, and on the defendants not resident or fund therein," approved the sixth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and
fiftv-nine.
2IPreliminary questions of jurisdiction under the Ac, of 1859 are properly raised in accorance with the Act of Mar. 5, 1925, P. L. 23; Lackawanna Company v. James, 296 Pa. 221
'2.3oudwinv. Boudwin, supra, at 149.
2
S 3oudwin v. Boudwin, (Dist. Ct. E. D. Pa.) 20 Fed. Supp. 903.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

uating of testimony concerning the same, (3) concerning any charge, lien, judgment, mortgage or encumbrance on tht same, and (4) where the court has
acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy by serving one or more
of the principal defendants. Still further are these first three classes of cases
modified by the provision that the res must be situated within the court's jurisdiction; and a comparable provision limits the fourth class to those cases where
the subject matter can be brought within the jurisdiction by personal service on a
principal defendant. 25a In Vanderstdot v. Pa. W. & P. Co., 21 where the property
was a dam extending partly into an adjoining county, the court refused relief
because the property was not "situate within the jurisdiction." In Eldredge v.
Eldredge,27 the court held that a mortgage is personal property, and therefore
governed by the principle "mobilia sequuntur personam" (movables follow the
person), hence can be reached only where the mortgage creditor is. In still
another interesting case, 28 the plaintiff administrator filed a bill in equity in
Philadelphia County, averring that a few days before decedent's death, defendant
by fraud and undue influence, had inveigled plaintiff into transferring to defendant an account in the Savings Fund Society of Philadelphia, five hundred eightynine shares of stock of the United Gas Improvement Company, and a mortgage
on Philadelphia premises. Defendant resided in Montgomery County, and the
bill was served there under the Act of 1859; at the time of service the title
papers evidencing ownership of the property were in the actual possession of
defendant. There the court held that the bank account, mortgage, and stock
certificate were not within the jurisdiction, being personal property and hence
follow the domicile of the owner. However, the court indicated, and properly
so, that the subject matter might be brought into the jurisdiction by personal
service on the principal defendant. In connection with this, it was held in The
Lebanon Velley Consolidated Water Supply Co. v. Commonwealth, 9 that the
Act does not. in an action to compel delivery of bonds secured by a mortgage on
lands in the county where instituted, warrant service on the defendant in a different county.
A still further question arises from a mere reading of the statute, namely,
what is meant by "principal defendant." Several cases have turned on this very
proposition. Although the courts couch their definition in very general terms,
making it necessary to decide each case on its own facts, it might be well to
observe what is said. Every case considering this issue has quoted with approval
the following excerpt from joy v. Wirtz: 0
25a60 C. J. 672 defines subject matter as "the cause; the object; the thing in controversy;
the thing in dispute.'" See also Eldredge v. Eldredge, 128 Pa. Super. Ct. 284, n. 290; Gallagher,
Adm. v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315, 318. The legislative intent as to the meaning here is questionable.
and the
cases to date have not been involved in that precise problem.
26
Vandersloot v. Pa. W. & P. Co., 259 Pa. 99 (1917).
7
2 Eldredge v. Eldredge, 128 Pa. Super. Ct. 284 (1937).
2
8Gallagher, Admr. v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315 (1936).
2
9Lebanon Valley Codsolidated Water Supply Co. v. Commonwealth, 257 Pa. 284 (1917).
30Joy v. Wirtz, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 518.

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

"In deciding who ought to be parties, it is necessary to distinguish
between active and passive parties; between those who are so necessarily involved in the subject in controversy and the relief sought
for, that no decree can be made without their being before the
court: and such as are formal or so far passive, that complete relief
can be afforded to those who seek it, without affecting the rights
of those who are omitted."
In Whittaker v. Miller,3 ' the Supreme Court stated, "If such unincorporated
association may be dissolved and its assets distributed to those entitled thereto
without the joinder of William Culp as a defendant, he is not a principal defendant within the scope of the Act of 1859 . . .It appears that William Culp,
the treasurer, has no more control over the affairs of the unincorporated association than any other member thereof . . . that his duties are ministerial only."
Up to this point, we have seen that the general requisites for jurisdiction
under this Act are a res; and that res must be within the court's jurisdiction, or
brought within it in a particular manner. Further than that, the suit must concern
that res. It is on this very requisite that the fate of the Act hangs; for by their
interpretation, the courts may or may not render the statute abortive for all
practical purposes. So frequently have the courts held that the type of action to
be entertained under this Act depends to a great extent on the type of decree
sought, or which must of necessity be given, that it is deemed expedient to
consider this phase of jurisdiction along with the problem of just what kind of
decree this statute does permit. We can best handle the matter by observing
general requirements laid down, following that with instances of the court's
action in specific cases.
ACTIONS AND DECREES

In the first three types of cases covered by the Act, our courts have consistently and rigidly held that the Act authorizes only a decree in rem. In Atlantic
Seaboard [Natural Gas Co. v. Whitten,3 2 the Supreme Court stated, "It is well
settled in this court that a decree against a defendant personally is not within
the purview of that Act." And in Hughes v. Hughes, the limitation was more
forcibly defined as follows: "Even if the defendant had been served with strict
rega.rd to the provisions of the Act of 1859, no jurisdiction would have been
conferred upon the Court to make personal decrees . . .No form of constructive
service, whether substituted . . . or by publication, can give a court power to
make a binding decree in personam against a non-resident: it would not be due
process of law.'"'"

31Whittaker v. Miller, 301 Pa. 410 at 413 (1930).
2
11Atiantic Seaboard Natural Gas Co. v. Whitten, 315 Pa. 529, 532 (19341.
:3Hughes v. Hughes, 306 Pa. 75 (1932).
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In the fourth class of cases, that where service is made on a principal
defendant, the decisions had until recently conveniently evaded the question of
decrees by disposing the case on the issue of whether or not the defendant was
a principal one. Now, however, our Supreme Court has committed itself in the
case of Shipley Massingham Co. v. Mutual Drug C0,,14 and in a per curiam
opinion states: "The court is unwilling to break the unbending rule as to service
of process on a non-resident defendant where the decree prayed for is in
personam."
It appears, in the light of the foregoing, that the plaintiff's problem will
be to persuade our courts to say that his suit is a proceeding in rem. And, if past
decisions permit of prognostication, we can safely say he will find the Pennsylvania courts anything but friendly.
In Gallagher, Admr. v. Rogan,35 our Supreme Court lays down this general
distinction:
"There is a wide distinction between a course of judicial procedure,
the object of which is to subject the res to the power of the State
directly by the judgment or decree which is entered, and a procedure
which only affects or disposes of the res by compelling a party to
the action to control or dispose of the res in accordance with the
mandate or decree. The former is a proceeding in rem; the latter is
a proceeding in personam. The suit before us is not specifically
directed toward the res; it is directed toward the owner of the res."
Through their decisions, the courts have quite strictly applied this distinction.
A reading of some of the cases will illustrate this conclusion.
A case which probably has engendered considerable doubt is that of The
Atlantic Seaboard Natural Gas Co. v. Whitten, 36 where the opinion was delivered
by Justice Maxey. The case involved a suit for specific performance of a contract
to lease oil lands within the court's jurisdiction. Service was had against the
Honolulu defendant owner in accordance with the Act of 1859, and the relief
sought was either a decree directing specific performance by the defendant, or
directing the prothonotary to execute a lease. The court refused plaintiff's prayer,
holding it to be well settled that, in the absence of any statutory modification, a
suit to compel specific performance of a contract to lease real property (or to
convey real property) is a suit in personam, besides having jurisdiction in rem.5 7
4

3 Shipley Massingham Co. v. Mutual Drug Co., 329 Pa. 552 (1938).
35Gallagher, Admr. v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315 (19361
a6Cited, supra.
87Act of 1901, Apr. 19, P. L. 83, No. I: "in any proceedings at law or in equity, in any of
the courts of this Commonwealth having jurisdiction, if the said court shall order a conveyance
to be executed by either of the parties to the said proceeding of his or her interest in any lands

or tenements to any other party or person, and the party so ordered shall neglect or refuse to
comply with the said order and make the said conveyance, or shall die, flee . .., or become insane without having complied, it shall be lawful for said court to order and direct that such
conveyance be made by the sheriff, prothonotary, or clerk, by a trustee specially appointed . .
Provided, that this shall not prevent the said court from punishing the contempt of the said party
by fine and imprisonment, if deemed necessary."
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Would not our statute of 1859 have been sufficient license for the court to
have granted relief in the lease case, on the theory that the proceeding was in
rem? One writer has stated:
"An examination of the proceedings in a suit for specific performance will disclose that it is in reality a proceeding in rem. The suit
is commonly thought of as brought to enforce a personal duty to
convey, but a consideration of what is actually done in such a suit
suggests a different view. The principal object of the suit is to
deprive the defendant of his interest in a particular thing...
Moreover, there are at present statutes in nearly every jurisdiction
giving courts of equity power to pass legal title to property either
directly by the decree of the court or indirectly by a deed executed
by some person appointed by the court. Clearly under such statutes,
a suit in equity for specific performance against the vendor (lessor)
has become a proceeding in rem both as to its object and as to the
8
effect of the decree and proceedings under it.''3
The case of Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co. of Baltimore City. "
sustiins this view. There the assignees of a lease containing a covenant of the
lessor, upon payment of the amount specified, to convey the reversion, filed a
bill in equity for specific performance of the covenant. Defendant lessors were
non-residents, served in accordance with a statute very similar to ours. The court
granted the relief, stating, "while the court could not enforce a decree requiring
a non-resident to execute a deed for the property, its decree may be made effective, under the Code, by the appointment of a trustee to convey the title . . . and
to that end the proceedings are in rem and not in personam."
While it is true we have no statute in Pennsylvania specifically authorizing
the appointment of a trustee or other officer to execute a lease, as we have for
deeds, yet it is questionable whether, in the presence of such statute, our court
would follow Maryland. We do, however, have a rule of equity practice providirg substantially the same thing; 40 but Justice Maxey negatived the applicability of this rule to the case in question. Some cases in foreign courts have
rationalized that a statute such as our Act of 1859 conferring jurisdiction in rem
aeHitchler, W. H., Equity Acts in Personam, 30 D. L. R. 61; citing Cook, Powers of Equity,
15 Ccl. L. R. 127; Hollander v. Central, etc., 109 Md. 131

(1909),

71 At.

442.

33Cited in footnote 38 supra.
4)Supreme Court equity rule No. 87 provides as follows: "The court, or any law judgr
thereoF, may also, in addition to the foregoing remedies, direct that the act required to be done.
shall be performed, if possible, by the prothonotary of the court, in the name of and for the
delinquent party, in the same way and manner and with like effect as if the latter had pe:.
formed it, and this effect shall be given to it although the party is under disability by reason
of infsncy, lunacy, coverture or otherwise. It may also be decreed that any instrument so executed shall be recorded and registered, if this could have been done had the delinquent pariy
obeyed the decree, the costs of drawing, acknowledging, recording and registering being charged
against him."
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necessarily implies power to enter appropriate decrees in rem." Could not this
have been a solution in the lease case, had the court desired to grant relief? In
any event, there are justifiable arguments as to why our courts should have a
change of heart in suits for specific performance where a res within the territory
is to be affected directly, and if our courts place the burden upon the legislature,
then it is time the legislature acts.
To conclude, we might briefly look at the label placed by our courts on other
types of proceedings under this Act. A bill for discovery and accounting was
held to be a proceeding in personam;42 a bill. to quiet title of lands was, by way
of dictum, held permissible under the Act of 1859;"3 a bill by a wife, to subject
the non-resident husband's property to proceedings for support, has been allowed; 44 a bill against a non-resident judgment creditor praying that judicial sale
proceeds be ordered paid into court was held proper;"6 and a suit by an owner of
land to enjoin non-residents, including state police, from interfering with bever46
age manufacture thereon, was held not an action in rem.
H.

LYNN EDWARDS

CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA-A SUMMARY
The words "character" and "reputation," although frequently used interchangeably, are not synonymous in legal meanings. Character is that which a
person actually is, morally. It is his disposition. Reputation is that which a
person is by others thought or estimated to be.' Character pertains to the real
person. Reputation pertains to the apparent person. Character is developed as a
result of the doing of specific acts, and, with the possible exception of the situation
where a self-analysis is in progress, must of necessity be viewed objectively.
Reputation is the community opinion, being a composite estimation of both friends
and foes, in which the respective prejudices may be expected to have become
neutralized. In this sense, it is submitted that a not improper definition of reputation is that it is objective character. This definition may be justified on the
ground that the reputation of the person whose character is the subject of inquiry
becomes, in the minds of his observers, his character.
We may say, then, that reputation is merely evidence of actual character,
and it is of necessity only an approximation of the truth. However, if the
41Bush v. Aldrich, 110 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922 (1918).
2
4 Degan v. Kiernan, 326 Pa. 397 (1937).
4
3Atlantic Seaboard, etc., v. Whitten; supra.
44
Boudwin v. Boudwin; supra.
46
Shreve v. Shreve, 305 Pa. 425 (1931).
46
Lunine v. Penna. Alcohol Permit Board, 305 Pa. 162 (1931).
'Hopkins v. Tate, 255 Pa. 56 (1916).

